The initial trigger for the protests was the draft law for the 2026 state budget—the first budget in euros. Planned increases in the dividend tax from 5 percent to 10 percent and an increase in social security contributions by 2 percent sparked dissatisfaction among employer organizations and business representatives because these changes affected employers more than workers. However, the budget’s ‘aesthetic’ problem came mostly from the way the government planned to pass it: without dialogue with employers and unions, hurriedly and without transparency.

The opposition warned that this was a ‘thieving budget’ that foresaw increased taxes and expenses benefiting employees of the Ministry of Interior and people in high positions (and high salaries) in the state administration. The message about a ‘thieving budget’ was embraced not only by employers and business groups—who were actually most harmed—but also by many citizens.

But in fact, the budget was only the pretext for the protest. Over recent months, social and civic discontent had built up against the governing coalition, which officially consisted of the largest right-wing party (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria – GERB), a small right-wing party (There Is Such a People – ITN), and the (now) small left-wing Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The problem with the government was that behind the scenes exerting influence was Delyan Peevski, widely considered the most influential politician, whose name has been associated with numerous corrupt dealings, including the collapse of a bank. He has enormous behind-the-scenes influence in Bulgarian politics, including the prosecution and judicial systems, and also economic influence in the local structures of the party that represents Bulgarian Turks and Muslims – Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS).

In 2013, Peevski’s figure also triggered mass protests that lasted more than 400 days. At the center of that discontent, again, was Peevski, seen as a symbol of corruption and mafia influence in Bulgarian politics.

How Do These Protests Differ from Others in Recent Years?

First, the protests were huge in number: the largest since 1997. In Sofia alone, on at least two days, over 100.000 people gathered, and some reports mention 150.000 on the final day before the government fell. Second, protests against corruption and the ‘mafia’ in Bulgaria are typically a capital city phenomenon, but in this case, other major cities also saw large turnout, and there were even protests in some smaller towns. Third, the focus was on the young generation, or so-called Generation Z. The presence of young people at the protests is not something new: the protests in 2013 and 2020 were also characterized by this. Although young people are politicizing themselves and participating actively as citizens with their own voice for the first time, the problem here is that they are more likely repeating and duplicating the already existing models of protesting, as well as the messages themselves, enriching them with new aesthetic elements. The images that were used in the protests to attack and caricature representatives of the ‘mafia’ were to a large extent dehumanizing—the image of the pig was the most prominently present.

What Positive Signs and What Critical Analysis Can Be Applied to These Protests?

First, in recent years, there was talk in Bulgaria about a democracy crisis, mostly because of record-low voter turnout in the last parliamentary elections. But citizen activity somewhat disproved these concerns: civil society, at least in this part, is still awake, and its sensitivity to arrogance, abuse of power, and corruption is not dead. The question is whether this energy will translate into action in the next elections. Second, it is troubling that for perhaps the first time in history, there were mass protests against a ‘profligate’ budget, especially protests against increases in taxes for business. In that sense, the protest started out more like a right-wing protest—don’t raise taxes, don’t take on new public debt, don’t overly increase state employee salaries, etc. At least the organizers from the opposition wanted it to be seen that way.

But even if that was not entirely the case, because the protest also included social demands—the usual calls for a good life, good education, healthcare, etc.—it seemed as if that generation lacked class consciousness, protesting alongside big capital.

Actually, this character of Bulgarian mass protests is not accidental. It has roots in the beginning of the ‘changes’ in the 1990s, when ‘progressive forces’ were those who wanted a break with the old model—a break with socialism. In a sense, the left ethos of protest has been co-opted by right-wing politicians and demands. A social protest against poverty and for better living conditions was possible only if it was voiced by progressive right-wing forces (then) or progressive liberals (now). For example, these two demands coincided in the protests of 1996-1997 against the government of Jean Videnov.

Unfortunately, in Bulgaria, cycles of protests repeat, and they are of a similar nature—big protests with a strong aesthetic element but mainly against corruption, the mafia, and the ‘model’. At the same time, these protests brought together people from different political families and ideologies, including nationalists who protested against adopting the euro.

What Comes Next After the Government’s Resignation?

The problem is that the effects of these protests in the socio-economic sphere are rather negative. Instead of adopting a regular budget for 2026 that would guarantee income increases for public sector workers, an extended budget will be adopted. This means that people’s incomes will fall behind inflation. The situation is critical, because there will be no regular government in the most crucial months immediately after the adoption of the euro. This opens up the possibility of greater instability: it opens the possibility of uncontrolled price increases, especially due to speculation.

For background, Bulgaria has met the criteria and its accession to the eurozone on January 1, 2026 is confirmed by the European Commission and European leaders. All necessary decisions have been taken and remain in force, meaning the country is on track to adopt the euro despite current political tensions.