On 8 July, the European Parliament approved Bulgaria’s entry into the eurozone by a large majority. Through this vote, Bulgaria – a country of six and a half million inhabitants in Eastern Europe – will begin to use the euro as its currency from 1 January 2026. What is the situation that led to this vote and what is Bulgaria’s future within the eurozone?

 Since 1997, Bulgaria has operated under a currency board, initially tying its currency, the lev, to the German Deutsch Mark. After the euro replaced the mark, the lev was pegged to the euro. This system has limited Bulgaria’s monetary independence by eliminating policing tools such as devaluation. As a consequence, many have argued that the use of the lev provides little benefits and only costs to Bulgaria. Advocates for Bulgarian sovereignty argue that the currency board should be dismantled. However, there is a broad political consensus that it is a safeguard against fiscal irresponsibility and against inflation.

 For the ruling centre-right coalition, and for most of the political representatives in the National Assembly, joining the eurozone is the culmination of Bulgaria’s full integration into the European family. Last year, Bulgaria joined the Schengen, the  agreement that allows visa free traffic within Europe (originally signed in Schengen, Luxemburg in 1995, Bulgaria joined in 2005 but only began its implementation in 2024). The sentiment among the political majority in the Bulgarian Parliament and within the executive branch is that joining the eurozone is a huge milestone for Bulgaria. However, this is not a view shared by the majority of Bulgaria’s citizens. A significant portion of the population believes that joining the eurozone has been a major success while a considerable number of critics argue that despite the economic benefits, the eurozone entry has stifled the will of the Bulgarian citizens who do not vote directly on its policies.

 Two years ago, the pro-Russian populist party Vazrazhdane took steps to hold a referendum on Bulgaria’s accession to the eurozone. However, the Parliament and the Constitutional Court deemed that it  would be unconstitutional. On 9 May 2025, the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev announced that he would propose a referendum on Bulgaria’s entry into the eurozone. Radev, president since 2017, a former commander of the Bulgarian Air Force who had served in NATO command as a major general, is often accused of insufficient loyalty to the European Union and NATO due to his criticism of the delivery of European weapons to Ukraine and the continuation of the war. The proposal by President Radev for the referendum was rejected by the Bulgarian parliament.

 All these actions catalysed a wave of discontent among a large part of Bulgarian citizens. According to a surveyby the Myara sociological agency on 14 May 2025, 54.9% of respondents said that if they had the opportunity to participate in a referendum, they would answer ‘I do not agree that Bulgaria should adopt the euro in 2026’; 34.4% would answer ‘I agree that Bulgaria should adopt the euro in 2026’. In the same survey, 63.3% of respondents supported holding a referendum, while 35.3% did not support holding such a referendum. Other surveys also show similar results.

 At the same time, the majority of Bulgarians support Bulgaria’s membership into the European Union, which enjoys a very high level of trust among citizens compared to other European countries. The scepticism of the majority of Bulgarians towards the euro is not due to Euroscepticism, but has a much more pragmatic and social explanation. The majority of Bulgarians’ skepticism toward the euro stems not from Euroscepticism but from pragmatic and social concerns.

While the ideologues of Euroscepticism, who tend to be positioned on the populist right, put forward economic arguments against joining the eurozone, among the majority of citizens, concerns are about price increases, particularly of food and services, not because of the nature of the eurozone or the currency itself, but because of the transition, which will inevitably create conditions for speculation, price increases, and inflation. These concerns are not unfounded, with the most recent and closest example being Croatia, where the government had to impose a price cap on certain goods.

 There has been no real debate about the euro in Bulgaria, not even a therapeutic one, and this fact may leave yet another wound in such a fragile democracy. In recent years, voter turnout in Bulgaria has been steadily declining, and the history of referendums in Bulgaria is unfortunate: citizens have a lasting feeling that they have no say, which is extremely harmful to democracy.

 This points to a broader issue: the absence of a meaningful public debate on euro adoption reveals a deeper democratic shortfall. When citizens feel unheard, policy decisions appear imposed from above, detached from the lived realities below. Such disconnect fosters distrust, fuels populist narratives, and breeds civic disengagement. It is in this context that we must understand the emerging protests against the euro – not as isolated acts, but as expressions of a growing democratic malaise.

 The media and the government tend to take on the role of ‘informing’ citizens about the logistics of accession and fighting, perhaps superficially, against ‘unjustified’ price increases and speculation during the transition period. In a country where over 800,000 citizens are classified as working poor, concerns over rising costs of essentials such as bread, electricity, and transport are not abstract macroeconomic worries but are existential concerns. In the absence of effective safeguards against speculation, price regulation as basic goods, or a coherent income policy, fears of inflation are not only understandable, but they are rational.